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Executives who live with uncertainty should resist the fallacy of arithmetic 
precision when making investment decisions, says Georgios Samakovitis 
of the University of Greenwich. 
It was the environmental academic Jerome Ravetz who said: “We believe in numbers, 
just because they are numbers.” Other science historians, including Theodore Porter, 
have long held the same view. This statement could not be more relevant as the global 
economy recovers from the biggest financial crisis since 1929. Many in management 
privately agree that we use numerical decision models with near religiousness, to 
convince that our decisions are scientifically robust, as few will doubt a well-founded, 
widely accepted mathematical model: we call on the legitimacy of arithmetic to 
persuade rather than prove. 
This is visible in both private and public sectors. Consider the response of the 
European Central Bank to the 2008 credit crunch: what used to be well-grounded 
sovereign debt and deficit ratios for EU countries were suddenly re-tagged as 
alarmingly unsustainable, and the countries in need of economic rescue, even though 
many still featured strong industrial production and healthy economic outlook. The 
same fundamentals, subjected to different numerical assumptions, gave distinctively 
different results, and that was deemed sufficient to realign markets and lower 
sovereign credit ratings. No questions were asked as to whether the assumptions were 
realistic or not; the ‘new numbers’ legitimised the ‘new reality’ by coming from the 
unchallengeable central bank’s rigorous models. 
Enter the corporate world and the same is most visible in, of all places, investment 
decisions. Especially in banking, evidence shows that decision-makers adjust numbers 
to make models deliver the outcome they desire. Research on technological investment 
decisions for internet banking in major UK banks between 1999 and 2006 
demonstrated that mathematical models are systematically used to advocate for a 
particular investment, instead of being employed to evaluate and compare candidate 
projects. Top executives acknowledge that people do play with the numbers to make 
them tell the story they want. Decisions are made on strategic grounds and then 
supported by a story told by numbers. 
Living with uncertainty 
Ever since the golden era of quantitative finance in the 1970s, conventional wisdom 
has it that more accurate models will drive more informed, and hence better, decisions. 
Yet the same practitioner wisdom says that most executive decisions, particularly ones 
on financial investment, are made, just because they have to, in the presence of 
uncertainty, if not ignorance. So good models abound, but decisions are made despite 
them. I call this the ‘paradox of practice’.  
The paradox becomes especially interesting when we consider the finance, accounting 
and economics background of decision-making individuals. A partial explanation is 
that the human brain is not an optimisation engine: decisions are taken in light of 
information available at the time, seeking good enough but not optimal solutions 
(Herbert Simon termed this 'satisficing’). Satisficing does not, however, explain why 
even the simplest and most well-established valuation techniques (such as, say, the net 
present value) are merely used to justify, rather than appraise, an investment. 
More light is shed when we consider who develops financial models, and who uses 
them. They are developed primarily by professional researchers as outcomes of 
applied research. They are used by professional managers in everyday decision-
making practice. 
The two groups have totally different professional interests. Academics seek 
recognition from the academic community through publication and dissemination of 
their work. Managers are not concerned with the model itself or its credibility, but with 
reaching a timely, effective and defensible investment decision in the presence of 
uncertainty. They cannot afford the luxury of time and rigour to select the right model, 
run it over investment options, prioritise them and hence make an optimal decision. 
They will rather go by intuition and experience, and then seek to legitimise their choice 
through the valuation models their firm has already adopted – in other words, follow 
the ‘corporate handbook’.  
Not adding up 
Improving precision is therefore irrelevant to better decision quality. Existing 
valuation techniques are accurate enough. Instead, decision models must account for 
the fact that financial valuation methodologies are indeed used as political tools for 
justification. What we need, I propose, is to actively surface the political advocacy by 
giving voice to the actors who directly and indirectly influence decision making. That 
will motivate consensus, but no longer through the ‘numbers proxy’. Articulating those 
interests will help negotiate pragmatic decisions, recognising decision making is not a 
numerical exercise but a social process and aiming for more informed as opposed to 
more accurate decisions. 
The view that better arithmetic precision is a mark of high quality is a weakness of the 
prevailing risk-based paradigm for investment decision making. Numerical models 
can do a lot to help us compare alternative solutions, if only along quantifiable 
parameters. Opportunity, ambiguity and uncertainty present us with a far richer 
quality of decision parameters than risk assessment models can, no matter how 
sophisticated. 
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